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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
All the parties to the proceedings below are listed in the caption. However, the only 
parties participating in this appeal are the plaintififs Judy Snell and LeRoy Snell, guardians 
and conservators of the estate of Kenneth Reed Snell and the defendant Draper City. The 
remaining defendants have been dismissed without prejudice from the proceedings. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2(a)-3(3)(j) (1996). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Whether the trial court erred in ruling that Draper did not owe a duty to Snell to 
maintain traffic control devices in a safe condition conducive to the safe flow of traffic where 
the imdisputed facts demonstrate that Draper had posted a 40 mile per hour speed limit sign 
on the west side of the Frontage Road to control southbound traffic but failed to post any 
speed limit signs or other traffic control devices on the east side of the road to similarly 
control northbound traffic, thereby creating an inherently dangerous and defective traffic 
control condition which Snell alleges was a proximate cause of the accident. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Because summary judgment only involves issues of law, this Court should review the 
trial court's conclusions for correctness. County Oaks Condominium Management v. Jones, 
851 P.2d 640 (Utah 1993); St. Benedicts Development v. St. Benedicts Hospital 811 P.2d 
194, 196 (Utah 1991). Additionally, "[o]n an appeal from summary judgment, we consider 
only two questions: whether the lower court erred in (1) applying the governing law and (2) 
holding that no material facts were in dispute." Nelson by and through Stuckman v. Salt 
Lake City. 919 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted). "Furthermore, because 
negligence cases often require the drawing of inferences from the facts, which is properly 
done by juries rather than judges summary judgment is appropriate in negligence case only 
in the clearest instances" Id. (quoting Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 
1991)). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-1, § 63-30-4(l)(b), 
63-30-8 and 63-30-10 (1993). Referenced sections are included at Tab 1 of the Appendix. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 13, 1993, Kenneth Reed Snell was seriously and permanently injured in 
an automobile and truck collision on a road under Draper City's control. The collision 
occurred on the east Frontage Road that parallels Interstate 15, at Point of the Mountain, 
Utah. Draper City had posted a 40 mile per hour speed limit sign regulating the flow of 
southbound traffic on the frontage road but had failed to post any speed limit signs similarly 
regulating the flow of northbound traffic on said road. The trial court granted Draper City's 
motion for summary judgment and ruled that Draper owed no duty to Kenneth Reed Snell 
to post similar traffic control devices for northbound traffic. This appeal is taken from the 
trial court's Order Granting City of Draper's Motion for Summary Judgment. Specifically, 
the trial court concluded that: (1) Draper had no duty to regulate northbound traffic 
notwithstanding that Draper had imdertaken to regulate southboimd traffic; and (2) that the 
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public duty doctrine barred Snell's claims. [Order Granting City of Draper's Motion for 
Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Order") at 3-5, a copy of which is attached hereto at Tab 
2 of the Appendix.] 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
The trial court found the following facts to be undisputed and material to its 
determination of the duty issue. 
1. Plaintiffs are the guardians and conservators of the estate of Kenneth Read 
Snell, who was seriously injured in an automobile collision in Draper, Utah, on October 13, 
1993. [Order at 2.] 
2. The collision occurred on the east frontage road that parallels Interstate 15, 
where it intersects with a private road leading to a sand and gravel facility. [Order at 2.] 
3. Mr. Snell was returning from the Lehi Animal Shelter, where he had picked 
up a load of animals to return to the University of Utah, where he was employed. [Order at 
2.] 
4. Mr. Snell was traveling northbound on the frontage road when the University 
of Utah van he was driving collided with a southbound large truck used to haul sand and 
gravel owned by Cazier Excavation. Darrell Casey, the driver of the Cazier truck, was 
proceeding southbound and turning left across the northbound lane onto the private dirt road 
which was owned and maintained by Geneva Rock. [Order at 2.] 
5. Draper City was responsible for the maintenance of the frontage road in 
question but not of the private road which intersected with it. [Order at 2.] 
6. The place of the accident was approximately one mile north of the south Draper 
City boundary. [Order at 2.] 
7. Prior to the accident, Draper had posted a 40 mile per hour speed limit sign 
on the west side of the frontage road which regulated the speed of southbound traffic that 
governed the operation of the Cazier truck. Draper City had not placed any speed limit signs, 
or signs warning of the intersection on the east side of the frontage road regulating the 
operation of the Snell vehicle. [Order at 3.] 
There is evidence that Kenneth Reed Snell will require 24-hour-per-day care and 
supervision for the balance of his natural life as a result of the injuries he suffered in this 
accident. There is also evidence that if Draper had regulated northbound traffic in a similar 
fashion to its regulation of the southbound traffic (40 miles per hour), and if Snell's vehicle 
had been traveling at 40 miles per hour, the accident would not have occurred, (R. 12) that 
Plaintiffs Responses to Defendant City of Draper's First Set of Interrogatories, Response 
to Interrogatory No. 27. In light of the trial court's ruling on the duty issue, it did not reach 
these facts. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in holding that Draper did not owe Snell a duty of reasonable care 
because the undisputed facts demonstrate that Draper affirmatively undertook to control the 
flow of traffic on the east frontage road where the collision occurred. Plaintiffs allege that 
Draper was negligent in the manner it chose to control such traffic. Utah courts and the 
majority of other jurisdictions have long recognized that municipalities have a nondelegable 
duty to exercise reasonable care in their regulation and maintenance of streets within the 
municipalities' control. 
Notwithstanding this well-established precedence, the trial court held that Draper 
owed Snell no duty because: (1) Draper's regulation of southbound traffic did not impose 
a duty on Draper to regulate northbound traffic in a similar fashion; and (2) the public duty 
doctrine barred SnelFs claim. Order at 3-5. More specifically, the trial court held that 
Draper's duty was a duty to all and that a duty to all is a duty to none absent a showing of a 
special relationship, which individual relationship the court found to be lacking. Id 
The trial court misinterpreted and misapplied Utah precedent. Accordingly, Section 
I of this Argument explains why Draper owed Snell a duty once it undertook to control the 
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safe flow of traffic on the frontage road. It further explains how the public duty doctrine may 
be reconciled with the courts' pronouncements holding that municipalities owe a duty of 
reasonable care in their regulation and maintenance of streets under their control. 
Alternatively, Section II argues that the public duty doctrine should be abrogated in total or 
at least in dangerous road condition cases in light of legislative mandates. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Draper Owed Snell a Duty to Exercise Reasonable Care Because Draper 
Affirmatively Undertook to Regulate and Control the Flow of Traffic When It 
Installed a 40 Mile An Hour Speed Limit Sign Governing Southbound Traffic. 
Utah has developed well-established precedent holding that governmental entities 
have a nondelegable duty to exercise reasonable care in their regulation and maintenance of 
streets and roadways within their control. See, e.g., Keegan v. State. 896 P.2d 618 (Utah 
1995); Braithwaite v. West Valley City Corp.. 860 P.2d 336 (Utah 1993); Duncan v. Union 
Pacific R. Co.. 842 P.2d 832 (Utah 1992); Trapp v. Salt Lake Citv Corp.. 835 P.2d 161 (Utah 
1992); Jerz v. Salt Lake County. 822 P.2d 770 (Utah 1991); Ingram v. Salt Lake City. 733 
P.2d 126 (Utah 1987) Richards v. Leavitt 716 P.2d 276 (Utah 1985); Bowen v. Riverton 
Citv. 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982); Bigelow v. Ingersoll. 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980); Murray v. 
Ogden Citv. 548 P.2d 896 (Utah 1976); Carroll v. State Road Common. 496 P.2d 888; 
Stevens v. Salt Lake County. 478 P.2d 496 (Utah 1970); Velasquez v. Union Pacific R. Co.. 
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469 P.2d 5 (Utah 1970); Bramel v. State Road ComnTn. 465 P.2d 534 (Utah 1970); Nyman 
v.Cedar Citv. 361 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1961); Rollow v. Ogden Citv. 66 Utah 475, 243 P. 791 
(1926); Pollari v. Salt Lake Citv. 176 P.2d 111 (Utah 1947); Berger v. Salt Lake City. 56 
Utah 403, 191 P. 233 (1920); Shugren v. Salt Lake City. 48 Utah 320, 159 P. 530 (1916); 
Sweet v. Salt Lake Citv. 43 Utah 306, 134 P. 1167 (1913); Robinson v. Salt Lake City. 40 
Utah 497, 121 P. 968 (1912); Bills v. Salt Lake Citv. 37 Utah 507,109 P. 745 (1910); Morris 
v. Salt Lake Citv. 35 Utah 474, 101 P. 373 (1909); Jones v. Ogden City. 32 Utah 221, 89 P. 
1006 (1907); Scott v. Provo City. 14 Utah 31,45 P. 1005 (1895); De Villiers v. Utah County. 
882 P.2d 1161 (Utah App. 1994); Jones v. Bountiful Citv Corp.. 834 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 
1992); Duncan v. Union Pacific R. Co.. 790 P.2d 595 (Utah App. 1990) 
For example, the Utah Supreme Court stated that a city has a nondelegable duty to 
maintain its traffic control devices in a condition conducive to the safe flow of traffic. 
Richards. 716 P.2d at 277-79. The court held that a claim against a city for negligent 
maintenance of a stop sign is subject to the notice of claim requirements in the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. JJL at 277-79. The court expressly adopted 18 Eugene 
McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 53.42 (3d ed. 1984) (hereinafter 
"McQuillin"), as a valid statement of the city's duty. Id. at 278-79. The court reasoned that 
"the rule is that once having elected to erect devices to guide, direct or illuminate traffic 
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where no duty exists to do so, a municipality then has a duty to maintain those devices in a 
condition conducive to the safe flow of traffic and will be liable for its negligence in failing 
to do so." IdL at 278 (quoting 18 McQuillin § 53.42). 
Further, in Bowen v. Riverton City, the court held that Riverton had a nondelegable 
duty to maintain its traffic control devices making summary judgment inappropriate where 
the city knew a stop sign was laying down for approximately eighteen minutes before an 
accident occurred at an intersection regulated by that stop sign. BoweiL 656 P.2d at 435-37. 
The court stated Utah's oft pronounced rule that: 
The city has a nondelegable duty to exercise due care in 
maintaining streets within its corporate boundaries in a 
reasonably safe condition for travel and the city may be held 
liable for injuries proximately resulting from its failure to do so. 
In fulfilling this duty, it is necessary for cities to maintain traffic 
control signals in a reasonably safe, visible, and working 
condition. Whether the city fulfilled its duty to maintain the city 
streets in a safe condition in the instant case is a question of fact 
to be determined by the jury. 
Id at 437 (citations omitted). 
The legislature has also implicitly recognized that governmental entities owe a duty 
of reasonable care in regulating and maintaining the safe flow of traffic. Specifically, Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-8 provides that "immunity from suit of all governmental entities is 
waived for any injury caused by the defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any 
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highway, road, [or] street" (Of course this waiver of immunity is qualified by the exception 
for discretionary or policy acts; see Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10.) Any waiver of immunity 
by the legislature would be rendered meaningless if governmental entities did not owe a duty 
in the first place. That governmental entities owe a duty of reasonable care in regulating and 
maintaining the safe flow of traffic seems obvious. 
Indeed, as was recognized by this Court in Jones v. Bountiful City, "decisions in a 
majority of the states affirm implied liability to private action for injuries resulting from 
defective public ways." Bountiful City. 834 P.2d at 560 (quoting 19 McQuillin § 54.02 (3d 
ed. 1985)). In Bountiful City, this Court held that Bountiful did not have a duty to install 
traffic control devices to regulate an unsigned intersection and that it did not have a duty to 
remove foliage on private property. Id. This Court reasoned that while a municipality is not 
generally affirmatively required to erect traffic control devices, "once the municipality takes 
action to install such devices, it must do so in a non-negligent manner." Id. (citing 19 
McQuillin § 54.28b (3d ed. 1985)Xemphasis added). McQuillin explains that "though a city 
is not generally liable for failure to install signs or signals, if it undertakes to do so and 
invites public reliance on such signs or signals, it may be held liable for creating a dangerous 
condition, or nuisance." 19 McQuillin § 54.28.10 (3d ed. 1994). 
Notwithstanding this well-established precedent, the trial court held that Draper did 
not owe Snell a duty because any duty Draper had was a duty to the public at large and not 
to Snell as an individual. [Order at 4-5; (R. 19-20).] The court relied expressly on the public 
duty doctrine in holding that SnelTs claims were barred. Order at 4-5. Unfortunately, the 
trial court misconstrued and misapplied the so-called public duty doctrine. 
At the core of the public duty doctrine is the notion that the law will only impose 
affirmative duties to act when a special relationship exists and absent a special relationship 
there is no duty. See, e.g., Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1991) (failure to control 
mental health patient); Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 1989); Beach v. University of 
Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986) (failure to control student); Pease v. Industrial Common, 694 
P.2d 613 (Utah 1984) (failure to aiTest allegedly drunken motorist); Obray v. Malmberg, 484 
P.2d 160 (Utah 1971) (failure to investigate burglary); Cannon v. University of Utah, 866 
P.2d 586 (Utah App. 1993) (failure to affirmatively assist pedestrians); Lamarr v. Utah Dep't 
of Transp.. 828 P.2d 535 (Utah App. 1992) (failure to construct additional walkways or 
control transients). 
In Beach the court held that the University of Utah had no duty to control a student 
on a field trip who wandered off from camp unnoticed and apparently fell off a cliff while 
intoxicated. Beach, 726 P.2d at 414-17. The court reasoned that only in "unusual 
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circumstances" would the court impose an "affirmative duty to care for another." IdL at 415. 
Further, the court stated that: 
The law imposes upon one party an affirmative duty to act only 
when certain special relationships exist between the parties. 
These relationships generally arise when one assumes 
responsibilities for another's safety or deprives another of his or 
her normal opportunities for self-protection. 
Id (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314(A) (1964)). The court found that no "special 
relationship" existed. Beach. 726 P.2d at 416-17. 
Likewise, in Ferree the court held that the State had no duty to affirmatively prevent 
a previously nonviolent inmate from killing a private citizen while the inmate was released 
into the temporary custody of his mother to attend a wedding. Ferree, 784 P.2d at 150-52. 
The court reasoned that "[d]uty is 'a question of whether the defendant is under any 
obligation for the benefit of a particular plaintiff.'" Id at 151 (quoting Prosser & Keeton on 
the Law of Torts § 53 (W. Page Keeton, 5th ed. 1984). The court contrasted this situation 
with situations where a governmental entity had assumed a specific duty of care or where the 
governmental entity had reason to appreciate that an inmate had demonstrated a capacity for 
violence. Ferree, 784 P.2d at 150-52. In finding that the State owed no duty of care, the 
court expressly reasoned that the State had no reason to know that the inmate was violent. 
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Finally, in Rollins, the court held that Utah State Hospital had no affirmative duty to 
prevent an AWOL mental health patient from subsequently stealing a vehicle and colliding 
with a private citizen. Rollins. 813 P.2d at 1158-62. The court stated "[w]e acknowledge 
the general application in Utah of the 'special relation' analysis described in sections 314 
through 320 of the Restatement of Torts." Id, at 1159 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§§314-20 (1965)). The court, after reviewing its previous decisions, employed a "pragmatic 
approach." Id. at 1160-62. The court reasoned that "[d]etennining whether one party has 
an affirmative duty to protect another... requires a careful consideration of the consequences 
for the parties and society at large." 14. at 1160 (quoting Beach, 726 P.2d at 418). 
Ultimately, the court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to establish a special relationship 
distinguishable to the hospital that would justify imposing on the hospital an affirmative duty 
to protect the plaintiff. Rollins, 813 P.2d at 1162. 
Here, the trial court erred in using the public duty doctrine as a shield to Draper's 
negligent regulation of traffic on the frontage road where Draper affirmatively acted in 
erecting a speed limit sign for only one direction of traffic on the same road. The public duty 
doctrine governs situations where the question is whether or not to impose an affirmative 
duty to act (or protect! for the benefit of a particular plaintiff. It does not govern situations 
where the governmental entity has affirmatively undertaken the duty. 
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To be certain, there is language in the various court pronouncements on the public 
duty doctrine that would lend credence to Justice Durham's comment that "a duty to all is 
a duty to none." Rollins. 813 P.2d at 1165 (Durham, J. concurring in part and dissenting in 
part; arguing for the abrogation of the public duty doctrine). But any such characterization 
of the public duty doctrine fails to appreciate the context in which these statements were 
made and, that at its core, the tort principle in question is whether to impose an affirmative 
duty to act. As has been acknowledged by legal commentators, there is a fundamental 
distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance. 
For example, in W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keaton on the Law of Torts § 56 
(5th ed. 1984), the authors explain: 
Liability for nonfeasance was therefore slow to receive 
recognition in the law. It first appears in the case of those 
engaged in 'public' callings, who, by holding themselves out to 
the public, were regarded as having undertaken a duty to give 
service, for the breach of which they were liable. With the 
development of the action of assumpsit, this principle was 
extended to anyone who, for a consideration, has undertaken to 
perform a promise— or what we now call a contract. During the 
last century, liability for 'nonfeasance' has been extended still 
further to a limited group of relations, in which custom, public 
sentiment and views of social policy have led the courts to find 
a duty of affirmative action. In such relationships the plaintiff 
is typically in some respect particularly vulnerable and 
dependent upon the defendant who, correspondingly, holds 
considerable power over the plaintiff's welfare... Liability for 
'misfeasance.' then, may extend to any person to whom harm 
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may reasonably be anticipated as a result of the defendant's 
conduct or perhaps even bevond: while for 'nonfeasance' it is 
necessary to find some definite relation between the parties, of 
such character that social policy justifies the imposition of a 
duty to act. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Further, the commentators of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, in explaining why 
the general rule is that a person does not have an afikmative duty to act even when that 
person's action is necessary for another's aid, state: 
a. The general rule stated in this Section should be read 
together with the other sections which follow. Special relations 
may exist between the actor and the other, as stated in § 314A, 
which impose upon the actor the duty to take affirmative 
precautions for the aid or protection of the other. The actor may 
have control of a third person, or of land or chattels, and be 
under a duty to exercise such control, as stated in §§ 316-20. 
The actor's prior conduct, whether tortious or innocent, may 
have created a situation of peril to the other, as result of which 
the actor is under a duty to act to prevent the harm, as stated in 
§§ 321 and 322. The actor may have committed himself to the 
performance of an undertaking, gratuitously or under contract, 
and so may have assumed a duty of reasonable care for the 
protection of the other, or even a third person, as stated in §§ 
323, 324, 324A. 
c. ... The origin of the rule lay in the early common law 
distinction between action and inaction, or 'misfeasance' and 
'nonfeasance.' In the early law one who injured another by a 
positive affirmative act was held liable without any great regard 
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even for his fault.... Hence liability for nonfeasance was slow 
to receive any recognition in the law. It appeared first in, and is 
still largely confined to, situations in which there was some 
special relation between the parties, on the basis of which the 
defendant was found to have a duty to take action for the aid or 
protection of the plaintiff. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314 (1965). 
Thus, once Draper undertook to regulate the flow of traffic on the frontage road, the 
analysis of its duty shifted from nonfeasance to misfeasance. The misfeasance analysis is set 
forth in Section 323 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Under that section, once an entity 
undertakes to perform a service, that entity has a duty to do so in a nonnegligent fashion. 
This analysis is implicit in all of the Utah decisions dealing with the defective or unsafe 
condition in roads and ways. If not, the public duty doctrine would bar all road defect cases 
because governmental entities do not construct, regulate, or maintain roads and ways for 
individuals, they do it for the public at large and it would be a fiction to pretend otherwise. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the frontage road was regulated by Draper for the public at 
large, Draper, once having chosen to so regulate the flow of traffic, owed a duty to regulate 
traffic "in a condition conducive to the safe flow of traffic and will be liable for its 
negligence in failing to do so." Richards, 716 P.2d at 278 (quoting 18 McQuillin § 53.42); 
see also. Bountiful City. 834 P.2d at 559-60. 
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This method of analysis found explicit acceptance in the recent Utah Supreme Court 
case of Nelson bv and through Stuckman v. Salt Lake Citv. 919 P.2d 568, 572-76 (Utah 
1996). In Nelson, the court held that the city (or alternatively, the state) owed a duty of 
reasonable care to protect the plaintiff from the dangers of the Jordan River once it (the city) 
decided to erect a fence between a park and the river. LI The court expressly rejected 
application of the public duty doctrine because the city had undertaken to provide protection. 
Id. The court reasoned: 
The common law recognizes a duty of due care on the 
part of an individual or entity that undertakes, whether 
gratuitously or for consideration, to perform a duty. Breach of 
that duty may result in an actionable tort. The Restatement of 
Torts describes this duty as follows: 
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to 
render services to another which he should recognize as 
necessary for the protection of the other's person or 
things, is subject to liability to the other for physical 
harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable 
care to perform his undertaking, if 
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of 
such harm, or 
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance 
upon the undertaking. 
IdL at 573 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1977). The court also reasoned that 
"'[w]here one undertakes an act which he has no duty to perform and another reasonably 
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relies upon the undertaking, the act must generally be performed with ordinary or reasonable 
care/" Nelson, 919 P.2d at 573 (quoting Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 208 (1989) and citing 
DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co.. 663 P.2d 433, 436 (Utah 1983)); see also Weber, bv and 
through Weber v. Springville. 725 P.2d 1360, 1364 (Utah 1986). 
Thus the court concluded that "once an entity undertakes to provide the protection, 
it is obligated to use reasonable care in providing it" Nelson, 919 P.2d at 573. Since the city 
had erected a fence, the court found it had assumed the duty to protect the plaintiff in a 
nonnegligent fashion. 14 at 572-74. (The court also found that discretionaxy immunity did 
not protect the municipality's negligent performance of its duty. LdL at 574-76.) 
Similarly, Draper owed Snell a duty to regulate the safe flow of traffic on the frontage 
road consistently from both directions of travel once it undertook to regulate southbound 
traffic with a 40 mile per hour speed limit sign. Draper argued, and the trial court accepted, 
that Draper's regulation of the flow of southbound traffic did not impose a duty upon Draper 
to regulate northbound traffic. (R. 4-20); Order at 4. This conclusion is erroneous for 
several reasons. 
First, as discussed above, it ignores Utah precedent which imposes a duty to regulate 
traffic in a condition conducive to the safe flow of traffic, and that breach of that duty will 
result in liability; particularly where the regulation contributes to or creates a hazardous 
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traffic condition. That Draper undertook this duty should be obvious given that it chose to 
regulate southbound traffic. 
Second, that conclusion requires the absurd assumption that the southbound lane of 
traffic exists independent and isolated from the northbound traffic. Surely the "safe flow of 
traffic" encompasses both sides of a two lane highway. Indeed, this is particularly true 
where, as here, motorists may lawfully cross the other lane of traffic in entering or exiting 
the highway or in passing other vehicles headed the same direction. This is even more true 
where the plain impUcation of Draper having posted a 40 mile per hour speed limit sign for 
southbound traffic is that Draper was aware of the dangerous conditions on the frontage road 
created by large trucks traveling upon, entering and exiting the frontage road. 
Third and finally, this conclusion ignores the fact that Draper's regulation of the 
frontage road created an inherently defective, unsafe and dangerous condition. Draper's 
affirmative act, by unevenly regulating traffic, created conflicting assumptions for drivers 
about the flow of traffic from the opposite direction. As a consequence of Draper's act, 
southbound traffic was regulated by the 40 mile per hour speed limit sign, while northbound 
traffic was regulated by Utah's default speed limit of 55 miles per hour. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6-46(2)(d) (1993). Taking Draper's (and the trial court's) conclusion to its logical end, 
Draper would not have a duty if it had posted 20 mile per hour speed limit signs and signs 
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warning of slow-moving, entering and exiting traffic so long as Draper had only posted these 
signs on the west side of the road governing only southbound traffic, while northbound 
traffic is traveling at 55 miles per hour. Under this reasoning, Draper would be found to have 
no duty where it posted a school crossing warning and 20 miles per hour speed limit for one 
direction of traffic and did nothing to regulate or warn traffic traveling in the opposite 
direction. The trial court's reasoning would lead to this and many other illogical results. 
Clearly, Draper owed Snell a duty to regulate the frontage road in a consistent 
condition conducive to the safe flow of traffic because it undertook to regulate the flow of 
traffic when it erected the 40 mile per hour speed limit sign for southbound traffic. Whether 
or not Draper breached this duty should appropriately be considered by the trier of fact. 
Accordingly, Snell respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's determination 
and hold that Draper owed Snell a duty of reasonable care in its regulation of traffic flow on 
the frontage road at Point of the Mountain, Draper, Utah. 
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n. 
Alternatively, this Court Should Abrogate the Public 
Duty Doctrine or Should Hold that a Governmental Entity's 
Duties related to Street Regulation, Construction and Maintenance 
are Exceptions to the Public Duty Doctrine. 
Should this Court determine that the public duty doctrine bars SnelTs claim against 
Draper because a duty to all is a duty to none, this Court should abrogate the public duty 
doctrine or, at a minimum, hold that Draper's duties related to street regulation, construction 
and maintenance are exceptions to the public duty doctrine. There are several well-founded 
reasons why the pubhc duty doctrine should not bar claims against governmental entities in 
street and road cases. 
First, and foremost, application of a judicially-created doctrine (whose origins are in 
nonfeasance situations) is inappropriate where the legislature has affirmatively waived 
immunity. The Utah Legislature has affirmatively and specifically provided that "immunity 
from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any injury caused by the defective, 
unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, road [or] street" Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 
(emphasis added) (of course this waiver of immunity is qualified by the exception for 
discretionary or policy acts; see Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10). The legislature has further 
explained that "[i]f immunity from suit is waived by this chapter, consent to be sued is 
granted, and liability of the entity shall be determined as if the entity were a private person." 
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Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(l)(b) (emphasis added). By this enactment, the legislature has 
foreclosed treating and analyzing the liability of public entities any differently from private 
persons. (It also produces uneven and unjust results by making an arbitrary distinction 
between possible defendants.) Hence, any rationale by the courts that the public duty 
doctrine is justified by policy considerations specific to public entities is inappropriate and 
meritless. 
Indeed as was stated in Bastian v. King. 661 P.2d 953, 956 (Utah 1983) (citations 
omitted), 
It is the power and responsibility of the Legislature to enact laws 
to promote the public health, safety, morals and general welfare 
of society and this Court will not substitute our judgment for 
that of the Legislature with respect to what best serves the public 
interest. 
Since the legislative power is vested in the Utah Legislature (see Utah Constitution Art. VI, 
§ 1) and the legislature has spoken on the matter, any contradictory result by the courts raises 
separation of powers concerns under Utah Constitution Art. V, § 1. State courts cannot, 
under the pretense of an actual case, assume powers vested in the legislature or undermine 
its pronouncements. Conrad v. City & County of Denver. 656 P.2d 662 (Colo. 1982); People 
in Interest of L.R.S.. 791 P.2d 1215 (Colo. App. 1990). 
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Besides, to the extent that public duty doctrine is justified by concerns over whether 
public entities will be exposed too broadly to liability and that this exposure will hamper the 
effectiveness of public entities (see, e.g., Ferree. 784 P.2d at 151; Cannon, 866 P.2d at 589), 
these concerns are still safeguarded by traditional tort notions of foreseeability, breach of 
duty, actual cause and proximate cause, and damages. See generally. Rollins. 813 P.2d at 
1164-68 (Durham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part; arguing for the abrogation of 
the public duty doctrine). Perhaps more importantly, the legislature has retained immunity 
in many instances; and even where the legislature has waived immunity, that waiver is 
subject to significant exceptions, such as immunity for discretionary or policy acts. 
While it is true that a number of decisions have made the analytical distinction 
between the affirmative defense of governmental immunity and whether a duty exists in the 
first place, the practical effect of such discussions offers a distinction without a difference. 
See, e.g.. Ferree. 784 P.2d at 151-53; Lamarr. 828 P.2d at 539-40. This approach is 
intellectually disingenuous because, regardless of theoretical distinctions and methods of 
analysis, the end result is always the same. If the court always analyzes whether a duty exists 
under the public duty doctrine prior to considering whether the legislature has waived 
immunity, the result will be to always find there is no duty in the first place. Unfortunately, 
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this approach renders the legislatures' waiver of sovereign immunity for dangerous road 
conditions meaningless. 
Finally, based upon the above-discussed reasons, there is a growing and significant 
trend to abrogate the public duty doctrine; including a majority of Utah's neighboring 
jurisdictions. Rollins. 813 P.2d at 1164-68 (Durham, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part; arguing for the abrogation of the public duty doctrine and noting the modern trend 
towards the same); see, e.g.. Busby v. Municipality of Anchorage. 741 P.2d 230 (Alaska 
1987); Adams v. State. 555 P.2d 235, 241-42 (Alaska 1976); Rvanv. State. 656 P.2d 597, 
598-99 (Ariz. 1982); Leake v. Cain. 720 P.2d 152, 158 (Colo. 1986); Commercial Carrier 
Corp. v. Indian River County. 371 So.2d 1010, 1016 (Fla. 1979); Wilson v. Nepstad. 282 
N.W.2d 664 (Iowa 1979); Stewart v. Schmieder. 386 So.2d 1351 (La. 1980); Jean W. v. 
Commonwealth. 610 N.E.2d 305 (Mass. 1993); Doucette v. Town of Bristol. 635 A.2d 1387 
(N.H. 1993); Senear v. Board of Bernalilo County Comm'rs. 687 P.2d 728 (N.M. 1984); 
Brennen v. Citv of Eugene. 591 P.2d 719, 725 (Or. 1979); Catone v. Medberry. 555 A.2d 328 
(R.I. 1989); Hudson v. Town of East Montpelier. 638 A.2d 561 (Ver. 1993); Coffey v. 
Milwaukee. 247 N.W.2d 132, 139 (Wis. 1976). 
As noted by McQuillin: 
The public duty rule has been abrogated in a number of 
jurisdictions. The states have rejected the public duty rule 
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because the rule is, in effect if not in theory, a continuation of 
the abolished governmental immunity doctrine. The rule also 
creates confusion in the law and produces uneven and 
inequitable results in practice. Courts abrogating the rule reject 
the contention that the public duty rule is the only principle 
protecting municipalities from massive liabilities; these courts 
maintain that ordinary tort rules, such as the rule requiring 
foreseeability of harm, will adequately limit the scope of 
municipal liability. These courts also remind us that abrogation 
of the doctrine of municipal governmental immunity merely 
removes the defense of immunity and does not create any new 
liability for a municipality. 
18 McQuillin § 53.04.25 (3d ed. 1993). McQuillin has also reasoned that once a 
municipaHty affirmatively acts (e.g. by erecting traffic control devices) that it has "assumed 
that duty" and "a special duty or special relationship comes into existence." 18 McQuillin 
§53.04.30 (3d ed. 1993). 
Simply stated, the application of the public duty doctrine in dangerous road condition 
cases makes no sense in light of legislative mandates. Accordingly, should this Court find 
that the public duty doctrine is a bar to Snells' claims, this Court should abrogate the public 
duty doctrine or at least find that dangerous road condition cases are exceptions to its 
application. Therefore, Snell respectfully requests that this Court abrogate the public duty 
doctrine in toto or at least as it applies to dangerous road condition cases. 
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CONCLUSION 
The lower court erred in granting Draper's Motion for Summary Judgment. Although 
Draper may not have had an affirmative duty to erect any traffic regulatory signs or devices 
on the frontage road initially, the law is clear that once Draper affirmatively acted by erecting 
a 40-mile per hour speed limit for the regulation of southbound traffic, the duty was imposed 
upon Draper to install such traffic regulatory devices in a non-negligent manner. Plaintiffs 
allege that the failure by Draper to provide consistent traffic regulation for motor vehicle 
traffic on the same two-lane road, at the same area, traveling in opposite directions 
constituted negligence on the part of Draper City. The failure of Draper City to provide 
consistent regulatoiy devices for both directions of traffic created a hazardous and defective 
condition on the frontage road. This failure, plaintiffs allege, was a proximate cause of the 
accident for which the plaintiffs are entitled to their day in court. The lower court's order 
granting summary judgment for the defendant should be reversed and the matter remanded 
for trial. 
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63-30-1. Short title. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act." 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 1. 
Meaning of "this act." — The term "this 
act," as used in this section, means Laws 1965, 
ch. 139, SS 1 to 37. which enacted §§ 63-30-1 
to 63-30-10, 63-30-11 to 63-30-28, and 63-30-31 
to 63-30-33. 
Cross-References. — Comparative negli-
gence, §S 78-27-37, 78-27-38. 
Insect infestation emergency control activi-
ties, immunity, § 4-35-8. 
Limitation of actions on claims against cit-
ies, § 78-12-30. 
Mailing claims to state or political subdivi-
sions. $ 63-37-1 et seq. 
Voluntary services for public entities, immu-
nity from liability, SS 63-30b-l to 63-30b-4. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Application of act. 
Equitable claims. 
Application of act. 
Governmental Immunity Act applies only to 
entities and does not include the entities' em-
ployees. Cornwall v. Larsen, 571 P.2d 925 
(Utah 1977). 
This act applies only to governmental enti-
ties and does not affect the personal liability of 
individuals for their own torts. Madsen v. 
State, 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 1978). 
Judicial review of a decision of the Division 
of State Lands to cancel a lease was authorized 
by former § 65-1-9 and did not require compli-
ance with the Governmental Immunitv Act. 
Adkins v. Division of State Lands. 719 P.2d 
524 (Utah 1986). 
Equitable claims. 
The Governmental Immunity Act did not 
abolish the common-law exception of equitable 
claims from governmental immunity: claims 
for overcharges on water and sewer service and 
for discrimination in failing to provide usual 
city services were equitable in nature, and gov-
ernmental immunity and lack of notice were 
not available as defenses. El Rancho Enters., 
Inc., v. Murray Citv Corp., 565 P.2d 778 (Utah 
1977). 
Governmental immunity is not a defense to 
equitable claims. Bowles v. State ex rel. De-
partment of Transp., 652 P.2d 1345 (Utah 
1982). 
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Utah Law Review. — The Utah Govern-
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Misapplication of Governmental Immunity 
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A New Perspective — Has Utah Entered the 
Twentieth Century in Tort Law?, 1981 Utah L. 
Rev. 495. 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi-
cial Decisions — Torts, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 244. 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi-
cial Decisions — Constitutional Law, 1990 
Utah L. Rev. 129. 
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Am. Jur. 2d. — 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal 
Corporations, Counties and Other Political 
Subdivisions § 680 et seq.; 57 Am. Jur. 2d Mu-
nicipal, School, and State Tort Liability § 1 et 
seq.: 68 Am. Jur. 2d Schools $8 5. 17;*72 Am. 
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239 et seq.; 63 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations Act for acts committed by aliens, 78 A.L.R. 
* 745 et seq.: 64 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations pe(j. 683. 
^ 2173 to 2214; 78 C.J.S. Schools and School Calculations of attorneys' fees under Federal 
Districts $» 100. 153, 238, 318 to 322; 79 C.J.S.
 T o r t C l a i m s A c t _ 2 8 y^g § 2678, 86 A.L.R. 
Schools and School Districts &S 423 to 444;
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81A C.J.S. Stat*. « 196 to 202. 267 et seq. Construction and application of Federal Tort 
A.L.R. - R.gh of contractor with federal,
 c l a i m s A c t p r o v i s i o n excepting from coverage 
state, or local public body to latter s immunity ^
 a interference with contract 
M An ^ i l i t y . 9 AL.R.3d 382.
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Modern status of doctrine of sovereign im-
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munity as applied to public schools and institu-
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tions of higher learning, 33 A.L.R.3d 703. ,. Application of collateral source rule m ac-
Immunitv of private schools and institutions t*0onjLunder FeAdeTrai T ° r t J C l a i i n 8 A c t ( 2 8 U S C S 
of higher learning from iiabiiitv in tort, 38 * 2674)> 1 0 4 A L R - F e d- 4 9 2-
A.L.R.3d 480. Appealability, under collateral order doc-
Sovereign immunity doctrine as precluding t r i n e - o f o r d e r denying qualified immunity in 
suit against sister state for tort committed 42 USCS § 1983 or Bivens action for damages 
within forum state, 81 A.L.R.3d 1239. where claim for equitable relief is also pending 
Official immunity of state national guard — post-Harlow cases, 105 A.L.R. Fed. 851. 
members. 52 A.L.R.4th 1095. Key Numbers. — Counties *=» 141 to 148, 
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Liability of school authorities for hiring or seq.; States «=» 112, 169 et seq., 191. 
63-30-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action for money or damages 
against a governmental entity or against an employee. 
(2) (a) "Employee" includes a governmental entity's officers, em-
ployees, servants, trustees, commissioners, members of a governing 
body, members of a board, members of a commission, or members of 
an advisory body, officers and employees in accordance with Section 
62A-4-603, student teachers certificated in accordance with Section 
53A-6-101, educational aides, students engaged in providing services 
to members of the public in the course of an approved medical, nurs-
ing, or other professional health care clinical training program, vol-
unteers, and tutors, but does not include an independent contractor. 
(b) "Employee" includes all of the positions identified in Subsec-
tion (2)(a), whether or not the individual holding that position re-
ceives compensation. 
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state and its political subdivi-
sions as defined in this chapter. 
(4) (a) "Governmental function" means any act, failure to act, opera-
tion, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or 
not the act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking is char-
acterized as governmental, proprietary, a core governmental func-
tion, unique to government, undertaken in a dual capacity, essential 
to or not essential to a government or governmental function, or 
could be performed by private enterprise or private persons. 
(b) A "governmental function" may be performed by any depart-
ment, agency, employee, agent, or officer of a governmental entity. 
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1198. 
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vide police protection to specifically threatened 
crime victim, 46 A.L.R.4th 948. 
Failure to restrain drunk driver as ground of 
liability of state or local governmental unit or 
officer, 48 A.L.R.4th 287. 
Governmental liability for failure to post 
highway deer crossing warning signs, 59 
A.L.R.4th 1217. 
State's liability for personal injuries from 
criminal attack in state park, 59 A.L.R.4th 
1236. 
Tort liability of public authority for failure 
to remove parentally abused or neglected chil-
dren from parents' custody, 60 A.L.R.4th 942. 
Tort liability of college or university for in-
jury suffered by student as a result of own or 
fellow student's intoxication, 62 A.L.R.4th 8L 
Hospital's liability for injury allegedly 
caused by failure to have properly qualified 
staff, 62 A.L.R.4th 692. 
Liability to one struck by golf club, 63 
A.L.R.4th 221. 
Tort liability of college, university, frater-
nity, or sorority for injury or death of member 
or prospective member by hazing or initiation 
activity, 68 A.L.R.4th 228. 
Governmental liability for negligence in li-
censing, regulating, or supervising private 
day-care home in which child is injured, 68 
A.L.R.4th 266. 
Right of one governmental subdivision to sue 
another such subdivision for damages, 11 
A.L.R.5th 630. 
Construction and application of Federal Tort 
Claims Act provision excepting from coverage 
claims arising out of assault and battery (28 
USCS § 2680(h)), 88 A.L.R. Fed. 7. 
63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as admission or de-
nial of liability — Effect of waiver of immunity — 
Exclusive remedy — Joinder of employee — Lim-
itations on personal liability. 
(1) (a) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifically provided, may 
be construed as an admission or denial of liability or responsibility by or 
for governmental entities or their employees. 
(b) If immunity from suit is waived by this chapter, consent to be sued 
is granted, and liability of the entity shall be determined as if the entity 
were a private person. 
(c) No cause of action or basis of liability is created by any waiver of 
immunity in this chapter, nor may any provision of this chapter be con-
strued as imposing strict liability or absolute liability. 
(2) Nothing in this chapter may be construed as adversely affecting any 
immunity from suit that a governmental entity or employee may otherwise 
assert under state or federal law. 
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), an action under this chapter 
against a governmental entity or its employee for an injury caused by an 
act or omission that occurs during the performance of the employee's 
duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority is a 
plaintiffs exclusive remedy. 
(b) A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any other civil action or pro-
ceeding based upon the same subject matter against the employee or the 
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63-30-5. Waiver of immunity as to contractual obliga-
tions. 






This section does not waive the notice re-
quirements for a suit against a state employee 
for acts or omissions occurring during the per-
formance of his duties, notwithstanding a 
nexus between the claim asserted and uany 
contractual obligation." Nielson v. Gurley, 888 
P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert, denied, 899 
R2d 1231 (Utah 1995). 
Implied covenants. 
By its waiver of immunity "as to any contrac-
tual obligation," the state is liable for its 
breaches of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing implicit in its contracts. Brown v. Weis, 
871 P.2d 552 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Cited in Broadbent v. Board of Educ, 283 
Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
63-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by defec-
tive, unsafe, or dangerous condition of high-
ways, bridges, or other structures. 





School bus route. 
Applicability. 
The 1991 amendment, providing that the 
waiver provisions of this section are subject to 
the discretionary function exception of § 60-30-
10, does not apply retroactively. Keegan v. 
State, 259 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (Utah 1995). 
Discretionary function. 
The Department of Transportation's decision 
not to raise a concrete barrier during highway 
surface overlay projects was not an operational 
decision involving the negligent installation or 
maintenance of a traffic device, but involved a 
policy-based plan and the exercise of judgment 
and discretion; thus, the decision was a discre-
tionary act shielded from liability. Keegan v. 
State, 259 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (Utah 1995). 
Governmental control. 
A governmental entity is affected by the 
waiver of immunity under this section only if it 
has control over the roads or highways upon 
which the dangerous condition exists. De 
Villiers v. Utah County, 882 P.2d 1161 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994). 
School bus route. 
Legislature did not intend to include the 
function of designing school bus routes within 
waiver of this section. Smith v. Weber County 
Sen. Dist, 877 P.2d 1276 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
63-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury from dangerous or 
defective public building, structure, or other 
public improvement — Exception. 





Before the 1991 amendments to the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, the discretionary 
function and assault and battery exceptions in 
§ 63-30-10 did not apply to the waiver of im-
munity in this section for defective or danger-
ous conditions in government buildings. The 
amendments were not retroactive. Taylor ex 
rel. Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. Dist, 881 P.2d 
907 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), reVd on other 
grounds, 902 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1995). 
Public park. 
Since the Governmental Immunity Act spe-
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cifically addresses public improvements, it is Baritault ex rel. De Baritault v. Salt Lake City 
the law most specific to a public park. De Corp., 286 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (Utah 1996). 
63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negli-
gent act or omission of employee — Exceptions. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of, in connection 
with, or results from: 
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused; 
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecu-
tion, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interfer-
ence with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or violation of civil 
rights; 
(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the failure or 
refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certificate, 
approval, order, or similar authorization; 
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or 
negligent inspection; 
(5) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative 
proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause; 
(6) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is negligent or 
intentional; 
(7) riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, mob violence, 
and civil disturbances; 
(8) the collection of and assessment of taxes; 
(9) the activities of the Utah National Guard; 
(10) the incarceration of any person in amy state prison, county or city 
jail, or other place of legal confinement; 
(11) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands, any 
condition existing in connection with an abandoned mine or mining 
operation, or any activity authorized by the School and Institutional Trust 
Lands Administration or the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands; 
(12) research or implementation of cloud management or seeding for 
the clearing of fog; 
(13) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or natural disasters; 
(14) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or storm systems; 
(15) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being driven in 
accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6-14; 
(16) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any highway, 
road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or 
other structure located on them; 
(17) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any public 
building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other public improvement; 
(18) the activities of: 
(a) providing emergency medical assistance; 
(b) fighting fire; 
(c) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or 
hazardous wastes; 
(d) emergency evacuations; or 
(e) intervening during dam emergencies; or 
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(19) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform 
any function pursuant to Title 73, Chapter 5a or Title 73, Chapter 10 
which immunity is in addition to all other immunities granted by law. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 10; 1975, ch. 
194, § 11; 1982, ch. 10, § 1; 1985, ch. 169, § 1; 
1989, ch. 185, § 1; 1989, ch. 187, § 3; 1989, 
ch. 268, § 29; 1990, ch. 15, §§ 1, 2; 1990, ch. 
319, §§ 1, 2; 1991, ch. 76, § 4; 1995, ch. 299, 
§ 35; 1996, ch. 159, § 6; 1996, ch. 264, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
ment,, effective May 1, 1995, substituted 
"School and Institutional Trust Lands Admin-
istration or the Division of Sovereign Lands 
and Forestry" for "Board of State Lands and 
Forestry" in Subsection (11). 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 159, effective 




Approval of plat. 





The University of Utah performs a govern-
mental function under the test developed in 
Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 
1230 (1980); thus, the immunity act is not 
unconstitutional as applied to a person who 
was injured when assaulted and struck by an 
employee of the University. Wright v. Univer-
sity of Utah, 876 R2d 380 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, 
denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994). 
Applicability. 
Before the 1991 amendments to the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, the discretionary 
function and assault and battery exceptions in 
this section did not apply to the waiver of 
immunity for defective or dangerous conditions 
in government buildings in § 63-30-9. The 
amendments were not retroactive. Taylor ex 
rel. Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. Dist., 881 P.2d 
907 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), reVd on other 
grounds, 902 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1995). 
The 1991 amendment of § 60-30-8, providing 
that the waiver provisions thereof are subject 
to the discretionary function exception of this 
section, does not apply retroactively. Keegan v. 
State, 259 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (Utah 1995). 
Approval of plat. 
A city's approval of a subdivision plat was 
clearly excepted by this section from any 
waiver of immunity, and plaintiffs claim char-
acterizing the city's conduct as designing an 
intersection was effectively barred. De Villiers 
results from" to the end of the introductory 
paragraph; deleted "or results from" from the 
beginning of Subsection (7); deleted "or in con-
nection with" from the beginning of Subsection 
(8); and substituted "Division of Forestry, Fire 
and State Lands" for "Division of Sovereign 
Lands and Forestry" in Subsection (11). 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 264, effective 
July 1, 1996, added Subsection (19), making a 
related stylistic change. 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
v. Utah County, 882 P2d 1161 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). 
Assault and battery. 
The State, a school district, the State School 
for the Deaf and Blind, and the State Board of 
Education were exempt under Subsection (6) 
for injuries resulting to plaintiff, a deaf child, 
who was sexually molested and assaulted by a 
cab driver in taxi hired by the defendants to 
transport handicapped children to school. S.H. 
ex rel. R.H. v. State, 865 P.2d 1363 (Utah 1993). 
Notwithstanding allegations that negligent 
implementation of a prerelease program led to 
plaintiffs injuries by assault and battery at the 
hands of a prerelease inmate, state defendants 
were immune from suit under the assault and 
battery exception in Subsection (2). Malcolm v. 
State, 878 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1994). 
Plaintiff's complaint based on injuries re-
ceived when she was assaulted and struck by 
an employee of the University of Utah and 
asserting that the injuries arose from the Uni-
versity's negligent hiring and supervision of the 
employee rather than from a battery was prop-
erly dismissed for failure to state a claim. This 
section focuses on the conduct or situation out 
of which the injury arose, not on the theory of 
liability crafted by the plaintiff or the type of 
negligence alleged. Wright v. University of 
Utah, 876 P.2d 380 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, de-
nied, 883 R2d 1359 (Utah 1994). 
An amendment to a complaint based on inju-
ries received when plaintiff was assaulted and 
struck by an employee of the University of Utah 
alleging that because of his questionable men-
tal condition, the employee lacked the requisite 
intent for assault and battery, thus making 
Subsection (2) of this section inapplicable, 
would be a fruitless attempt to circumvent the 
clear language of the section. Wright v. Univer-
sity of Utah, 876 P.2d 380 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, 
denied, 883 P2d 1359 (Utah 1994). 
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Subsection (2) does not require that the per-
son committing an assault and battery must be 
engaged in a governmental function in order for 
a government entity to qualify for immunity 
under this section. The immunity act specifies 
only that a court examine generally whether 
the activity that the governmental entity per-
forms is a governmental function under § 63-
30-30. Wright v. University of Utah, 876 R2d 
380 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 
(Utah 1994). 
Discretionary function. 
The Department of Transportation's decision 
not to raise a concrete barrier during highway 
surface overlay projects was not an operational 
decision involving the negligent installation or 
maintenance of a traffic device, but involved a 
policy-based plan and the exercise of judgment 
and discretion; thus, the decision was a discre-
tionary act shielded from liability. Keegan v. 
State, 259 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (Utah 1995). 
Sovereign immunity. 
Acts that are core governmental functions or 
are unique to government are outside the pro-
tection of Utah Const., Art I., Sec. 11; thus, in 
an action against a county building official and 
the county for injuries based on negligent in-
spection of a building and fraudulent issuance 
of a building permit, the defendants' acts were 
core governmental functions within the scope of 
the exceptions to waiver of immunity in Sub-
sections (3) and (4). DeBry v. Noble, 257 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1995). 
Subsections (3) and (4) of § 63-30-4 contem-
plate that a government employee can be sued 
for fraud even if the employee acted in a repre-
sentative capacity; thus, even though the gov-
ernmental agency may be immune from liabil-
ity under this section, an employee who 
commits fraud in the course of his employment 
can be held personally liable. DeBry v. Noble, 
257 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1995). 
Cited in Day v. State, ex rel. Utah Dep't of 
Pub. Safety, 882 P.2d 1150 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994); Rocky Mt. Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake 
City Corp., 887 P.2d 848 (Utah 1994). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AXJL — Municipal liability for negligent 
performance of building inspector's duties, 24 
A.L.R.5th 200. 
63-30-11. Claim for injury — Notice — Contents — Service 
— Legal disability. 




Sufficiency of notice. 
Cited. 
Defendant's capacity. 
Because it was clear that defendant engaged 
in the conduct complained of while performing 
his duties as a state employee and the plaintiff 
was aware that the defendant claimed to have 
acted under color of authority, the plaintiff 
could not complain on appeal that the Govern-
mental Immunity Act did not apply because he 
meant to sue defendant as an ordinary indi-
vidual, not for anything he did in the course of 
his employment by the state. Nielson v. Gurley, 
888 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert, denied, 
899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995). 
Notice. 
Plaintiff's filing of a notice of claim with the 
governmental agency alleged to be responsible 
for his injuries, but not with the attorney gen-
eral, did not satisfy the notice requirements of 
this section and § 63-3-12, even though the 
agency forwarded the notice to the attorney 
general. Litster v. Utah Valley Community Col-
lege, 881 P.2d 933 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
This section does not waive the notice re-
quirements for a suit against a state employee 
for acts or omissions occurring during the per-
formance of his duties, notwithstanding a 
nexus between the claim asserted and "any 
contractual obligation." Nielson v. Gurley, 888 
P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert, denied, 899 
P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995). 
Sufficiency of notice. 
Notice was deficient that came more than one 
year after the claim arose; this deficiency was 
fatal to the trial court's jurisdiction. Nielson v. 
Gurley, 888 R2d 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert, 
denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995). 
In personal injury action against county, 
plaintiff fulfilled purpose of notice requirement 
by filing notice of her claim with the person in 
the county attorney's office designated by the 
county commission as the appropriate person to 
whom such notice should be sent. Bischel v. 
Merritt, 278 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995). 
Cited in Bellonio v. Salt Lake City Corp., 284 
Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY; UTAH COUNTY; 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION; CITY OF DRAPER, 
UTAH; and CITY OF LEHI, UTAH, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING 
CITY OF DRAPER'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 950906363 PI 
Judge William B. Bohling 
The Motion for Summary Judgment of City of Draper ("Draper") 
came on regularly for hearing on June 24, 1996. Plaintiffs were 
represented by their counsel John L. Young of Richards, Brandt, 
Miller & Nelson; Draper was represented by its counsel Dennis C. 
Ferguson of Williams & Hunt; appearing for defendant Utah County 
was David C. Richards of Christensen & Jensen. The issues 
presented by Draper's Motion for Summary Judgment were fully 
briefed and the Court, having reviewed the respective memoranda 
of the parties prior to the hearing, heard and considered the 
argument of counsel and, being fully advised, finds that there is 
no dispute regarding the facts that are material to the case that 
would preclude ruling on Draper's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The facts that are undisputed and that are material to the 
Court's determination of the duty issue, include the following: 
1. Plaintiffs are the guardians and conservators of the 
estate of Kenneth Read Snell, who was seriously injured in an 
automobile collision in Draper, Utah on October 13, 1993. 
2. The collision occurred on the east frontage road that 
parallels Interstate 15, where it intersects with a private road 
leading to a sand and gravel facility. 
3. Mr. Snell was returning from the Lehi Animal Shelter, 
where he had picked up a load of animals to return to the 
University of Utah, who was his employer at the time. 
4. Mr. Snell was traveling northbound on the frontage road 
and the University of Utah van he was driving collided with a 
large truck used to haul sand and gravel owned by Cazier 
Excavation. Darrell Casey, the driver of the Cazier truck, was 
turning left onto the private dirt road which was owned and 
maintained by Geneva Rock. 
5. Draper City was responsible for the maintenance of the 
frontage road in question but not of the private road which 
intersected with it. 
6. The place of the accident was approximately one mile 
north of the south Draper City boundary. 
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7. Prior to the accident, Draper had posted a 40 mile per 
hour speed limit sign on the west side of the frontage road which 
was visible to southbound traffic. Draper City had not placed on 
the east side of the frontage road any speed limit signs, or 
other signs warning of the intersection, along the one mile 
stretch from its southern-most border to the gravel facility 
road. 
Based upon these undisputed facts, plaintiffs claim that 
Draper owed a duty to Kenneth Snell to have placed a speed limit 
sign on the east side of the frontage road. Plaintiffs claim 
that the failure to place such a speed limit sign was negligence 
and that the negligence was a proximate cause of the accident. 
Draper seeks summary judgment on three theories: (1) it 
does not owe a duty to erect the speed limit sign or other 
warning signs, but a duty only to maintain those it has erected; 
(2) any duty that is owed is a duty owed to the public at large 
and plaintiffs' claims are barred by the public duty doctrine; 
and (3) immunity from suit has not been waived under Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-8, which waives immunity for injury caused by a 
defective, unsafe or dangerous condition of any highway, because 
Draper did not control the gravel road which is alleged to have 
created the dangerous condition. Plaintiffs acknowledge the 
general rule that a governmental entity has no duty to erect 
warning signs, even though it has a duty to maintain roads in a 
condition reasonably safe for travel. Jones v. Bountiful City, 
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834 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1993); De Villiers v. Utah County, 882 
P.2d 1161 (Utah App. 1994). Plaintiffs argue, however, that once 
Draper placed a speed limit sign controlling the southbound 
traffic that it had a duty to place a similar sign, in an 
appropriate position controlling northbound traffic. 
Whether a duty exists is a question of law for the Court to 
determine. Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 198 9) ; LaMarr v. 
Utah Department of Transportation, 828 P.2d 535 (Utah App. 1992). 
Based upon the undisputed material facts and the precedent 
established by current case law, the Court finds that there is no 
duty on the part of Draper to have erected a speed limit sign on 
the east side of the frontage road. As stated in De Villiers v. 
Utah County, supra., and Jones v. Bountiful City, supra., 
Draper's duty is to maintain those signs which it has placed. 
The Court is not persuaded that by having placed one sign on the 
west side of the frontage road restricting speed of southbound 
traffic to 40 miles per hour that Draper then has the duty to 
place other speed limit signs elsewhere. 
With respect to the defense that the plaintiffs' claims are 
barred by the "public duty doctrine", Draper asserts that the 
holding of Cannon v. University of Utah, 866 P. 2d 586 .(Utah 1993) 
is dispositive. Under the "public duty doctrine", a duty to all 
is a duty to none. The Court finds that for Draper to be liable 
for a negligently-caused injury suffered by the plaintiffs, the 
plaintiffs must show a breach of duty owed to Kenneth Snell as an 
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individual, not merely a breach of an obligation owed to the 
general public at large. The Court finds that Draper, having 
posted 40 mile per hour speed limits for southbound traffic on 
the frontage road, did so for the public at large and had no duty 
to Kenneth Snell to post similar traffic regulations for his 
benefit northbound on the same frontage road. | 
Because the Court finds in favor of Draper on the duty 
issue, it does not reach the governmental immunity issue also 
raised in Draper's Motion for Summary Judgment. Therefore, based 
upon the undisputed facts and the legal conclusions recited 
herein, the Court hereby 
ORDERS AND ADJUDGES that the Motion for Summary Judgment of 
Draper City be and the same is hereby GRANTED and plaintiffs' 
case against Draper is dismissed as a matter of law and with 
prejudice. Each of the parties is to bear his, her or its 
respective costs and attorneys' fees incurred herein. 
DATED this OU> day of July, 1996. 
